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Abstract
We examine the effects of socioeconomic and political factors on the distribution
of conditional cash transfer (CCT) (Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)) in Indonesia.
The distribution of CCT is measured by budget allocation of PKH distributed to local
government. The objects of this study are the local governments that received the
budget allocation of PKH in 2013–2015 with a sample size of 1.005 local governments.
Using panel data on 335 local government from 2013–2015, we find that vote shares
and competitiveness are positively associated with the distribution of PKH, while the
socioeconomic factors are insignificant. This indicates that the CCT program is used by
the politicians to maintain their power in government.
Keywords: conditional cash transfer, program keluarga harapan, socioeconomics,
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1. Introduction
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have been widely adopted as a protection
of social policies to resolve the problem of poverty in many developing countries [13].
Having originated in Brazil and Mexico, over 30 countries now provide small stipends
to poor families in exchange for their meetingspecific conditions, such as scheduling
prenatal checkups or maintaining sufficient school attendance [12]. These reports pay
little attention to the potential for political interference in how transfers are distributed.
CCT programs that are actually social protection programs are often manipulated by
political criteria [8, 19]. Boadway and Shah (2007) find that the political motivation
underlying the government program will lead to a welfare loss, excessive government
spending and inequalities.
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Empirical evidence suggests that politicization of social assistance program occurs
in countries like Mexico [8, 19], Brazil [13, 26, 27], Turkey [1] and Colombia [2]. Schady
(2000) showed a significant increase in social assistance spending (FONCODES) before
the national election year. Other empirical evidence suggest the effect of political
criteria to CCT programs. The CCT programs will increase the incumbent’s vote in the
presidential election [8, 27]. Aytaç (2014) examined the distribution of CCT program in
Turkey using socioeconomic and political factors. It showed that setting of multiparty
competition presents incentives to the incumbent party to channel disproportionately
more resources to the districts with an ideologically close challenger. In contrast to
empirical evidence of political criteria in CCT, Corrêa (2015) shows that the investment
in CCT programs is not associated with incumbents vote swing. Fried (2012) shows
that the distribution of the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil is not influenced by political
criteria.
Evidence about political budget cycles (PBCs) were also found in Indonesia. Sjahrir,
Kis-Katos and Schulze (2013) find significant PBCs for Indonesian districts’ direct elec-
tions and it was stronger if the incumbent runs for reelection. Politicianmay use discre-
tionary spending such as social protection programs to favor their position. Member of
the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK), Rizal Djalil stated that the allocation
of social assistance spending in the state budget (APBN)/local government budget
(APBD) is designed for the interests of the authorities, both in terms of political ambi-
tions and personal interest, with a mode of social-assistance spending that increased
significantly ahead of the election.
As social-protection program that have been popularly adopted in many countries,
Indonesia also has CCT program called Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH). In this article,
we want to examine whether the political criteria are affecting the distribution of CCT.
We focus on PKH for the following reason. First, PKH is the social protection program
with CCT mechanism that was created in 2007. Both beneficiaries and allocation of
PKH have increasingly from this program is created until 2015. Especially in 2013, the
distribution of CCT to local government had significant increase from the previous year.
Second, PKH is the national-level program that can be categorized as best-practice
implementation of social protection [3]. Impact evaluation conducted by World Bank
(2011) show that PKH is an effective program to improve the social welfare and has
a positive effect to increase the use of health services for beneficiaries. However, in
the education sector, PKH has a little effect to improve education for beneficiaries.
This shows the effectiveness of CCT in Indonesia as a social protection program is not
yet optimal. The impact and effectiveness of CCT can also be seen from the trend
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of allocation as well as measures of socioeconomic achievement such as HDI and
the percentage of poor peoples, that is shown in Figure 1. With this background and
achievement, we want to examine whether socioeconomic and political criteria affect
the distribution of CCT.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature
of the PBC, pork barrel spending and voting behavior. Section 3 describes CCT program
in Indonesia. The data and the econometric model are described in Section 4. Section
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Figure 1: CCT Budget allocations, HDI and percentage of poor. Source: Ministry of Social (2015) and BPS
(2015).
2. Literature Review
2.1. Political budget cycle (PBC) and pork barrel spending
Since 2004, national elections in Indonesia have been carried out directly, both the
presidential and legislative elections. The implementation of the direct election will
provide a greater tendency for candidates to conduct money politics to the public.
Political parties that have power in the government will be attempted to maintain their
power by manipulating government resources. The phenomenon of PBC arises from
a perception that politicians will use their power to ‘manipulate’ the budget ahead of
elections in terms of policy, spending or deficits to increase the chance of reelection
or maintaining his power in government. Nordhaus (1975) calls this phenomenon a
‘political business cycle’ which means that a macroeconomic cycle was affected by
the political cycle. The political economy literature is now more focused on policy
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instruments thanmacroeconomic conditions to analyze their impact on election results
[4]. Drazen and Eslava (2006) describe the PBC, as an incumbent candidate’s effort to
advance voters by providing public spending to certain groups, conducted before the
election (opportunistic) or after the election (political promise).
A distributive policy is a political decision that concentrates benefits in a specific
geographic constituency and finances expenditures through generalized taxation. Dis-
tributive policy program targeted to a geographic location and generating benefits in
that geographic location unrelated projects in other locations [24]. Distributive policy
programs are like infrastructure programs. In theoretical concept, social protection
programs are non-distributive programs. But, empirical pieces of evidence suggest
that social policy program especially CCT is a distributive program that was affected
by political criteria. CCT programs that are actually social protection programs are often
manipulated by political criteria [8, 19]. Government’s massive CCT program, Bolsa
Familia, represents an important change for the support base of incumbent candi-
date and furthermore presidential candidate from incumbent party in Brazil always
performs better in the less-developed regions of the country [26].
Several empirical studies suggest that economic factors alone do not satisfactorily
explain the variation in the geographic allocation of targetable goods or social program
spending. Political factors play an important role as well, with primarily two views
on how distributive programs, such as CCT, can optimize electoral performance. The
swing district hypothesis posits that politician should channel disproportionately more
resources to highly competitive districts, that is, swing districts [9, 14]. In contrast,
the core district hypothesis holds that material benefits should be directed toward the
strongholds of the politician [6]. Both models explain the politician’s strategy to win
the election competition by distributing public spending to specific groups aimed to
influencing voters [6, 9, 14].
In voting-behavior model, Downs (1957) explains that in a democratic system, polit-
ical parties will formulate policies for the interest in elections. Social programs such
as CCT is interesting to analyze because of the possible linkages between poverty-
alleviation programs and the political interests of certain groups. CCT politicization has
been widely studied such as CCT in Peru/FONCODES [17], Brazil/Bolsa Familia [13, 27],
Meksiko/Progresa [8], Colombia/Familias en Acción [2, 16] and Turki [1].
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i8.2526 Page 456
ICIFEB
2.1.1. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) in Indonesia
CCT programs offer countries a new way to tackle poverty and prevent the trans-
mission of poverty to future generations [25]. The CCT program provides regular cash
payment to poor families, so that the beneficiaries can access basic needs such as
education and health [1, 25]. Indonesia has implemented a CCT program called PKH.
PKH is a CCT program that provides quarterly cash transfers to very poor households
in Indonesia by requiring education and health provisions for recipients [25].
The beneficiary should meet at least one of the three required conditions, that is,
(1) households with pregnant and/or lactating women, (2) households with children
aged 0–15 years and (3) households with children aged 16–18 years who have not yet
completed 9 years of basic education.
PKH was launched as a pilot social assistance program in 2007 that has short-term
and long-term goals of poverty reduction. In the short-term, PKH aims to provide short-
term assistance to the poor aswell as in the long-term to reduce poverty and inequality
by providing incentives for investment in human resources. Since 2007, PKH has always
increased, both in terms of allocation and coverage. In 2007, PKHwas implemented in 7
provinces, 48 districts/municipalities and served 387,928 beneficiaries with a budget of
508 million rupiah. Until 2015, PKH was implemented to serve 3.5 million beneficiaries
with a budget of 6.5 billion rupiah [22]. In 2016, PKH coverage increased by 42 percent
from the previous year to 6 million beneficiaries.
2.2. Socioeconomic or political factors?
A study about the impact evaluation of CCT as a social protection program has been
widely used to determine the effectiveness of CCT programs in tackling poverty. Based
on the results of the PKH impact evaluation study, overall PKH has a positive impact on
a number of health and education indicators. Health indicators showed an increase of 3
percent points of Posyandu visits, 5 percent points rise in child-growth monitoring and
0.3 percent points increase in immunization activities. While the education indicator
shows the increase in attendance of children in school by 0.2 percent points (BAPPE-
NAS, 2009). The results of the World Bank (2011) evaluation show similar results to
the Bappenas evaluation, that is, PKH is relatively effective in improving the welfare
of beneficiary poor families and having a positive impact on improving the use of
health services. However, in the field of education, PKH has a relatively small impact
in changing behavior in education.
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The massive increase in the number of countries adopting CCT as an effort to cope
with poverty the research on CCT not only lets us know its effectiveness but also
the impact of CCT on electoral performance. Poverty and politics have an interesting
relationship to study. In this study, we try to show whether the distribution of CCT in
Indonesia is influenced by socioeconomic or political factors.
As explained earlier, the main goal of CCT is to tackle poverty. Beneficiaries of PKH
are very poor households with the welfare rank of 7 percent the lowest. Hence, we
argue that the poverty rate is positively associated with the distribution of PKH. Aytaç
(2014) shows that the infant mortality rate and the geographic location of the area
which is the proxy of poverty measure of a region are positively associated with
CCT allocation. Schady (2000) suggests a similar result, CCT allocations are directed
to regions with large poverty rates. Both indicate that CCT has an important function
as a redistribution program.
PKH is an effort to build social protection system to the poor in order to maintain
and improve social welfare of the poor as well as efforts to combating the poverty. To
achieve the goals, beneficiaries are expected to be able to access health and education
sector. HDI explains how people can access the development outcomes in obtaining
income, health, education and so on. Two-third component in HDI formula are gener-
ated through access of health and education. Hence, we argue that HDI is negatively
associated with the distribution of PKH. This is because the higher HDI of a region indi-
cates that the region has a high quality of human resources so that the governmentwill
provide smaller CCT allocation. Aytaç (2014) shows that HDI has a negative relationship
with CCT allocation.
The last socioeconomic factor is the social expenditure. Local governments with
larger social spending such as subsidies, social assistance and grants indicate that
the region has a great capacity to maintain the welfare of its citizen through the
implementation of local government social programs. Veiga and Veiga (2013) show
the grant expenditure transfers in the previous year (t–1) negatively associated with
the allocation of grant spending during the election year. Hence, the authors argue that
social spending in the previous year (t–1) is negatively associated to the distribution
of PKH.
In a government institution, political factors cannot be ruled out from the policy-
making process because both the president and the legislature are both elected
through a political process of election. The existence of moral hazard to maintain
its power in the government, the interests of certain groups and lobbying in policy-
making are the causes of politicians using government resources for their personal
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interests, rather than for the welfare of the society [18]. Schady (2000) shows that
the president-vote shares had a positive effect on the distribution of CCT in Peru,
which can be interpreted as that the politicians will allocate larger CCT to region that
consists the core voters. President-vote shares represent the extent of public support
to the president candidate in the national election. We argue that president-vote share
is positively associated with the distribution of PKH. The president elected from the
previous election will attempt to maintain his authority or his political-party’s position
in the government. Politicians will influence voters by using social programs like CCT.
It is because CCT beneficiaries will have a preference for choosing an incumbent
candidate [2, 8, 26].
The second political factor is a political constellation showing the political relation-
ship between central government and the local government. The ruling party in the
legislation will have a preference for allocating resources (CCT) to the region with a
strong political constellation aimed to maintaining the power of its political party in the
region. Veiga and Veiga (2013) show that the similarity of political parties in the central
and local governments has a positive effect on the allocation of grant expenditure.
The last political factor is competitiveness. In a region with high competitiveness,
elected presidents in previous election will allocate greater CCT as an effort to maintain
authority by influencing voters’ behavior. Schady (2000) uses the marginality vote
shares to measure the level of political competition. The study shows that CCT allo-
cation is directed to the region with high marginal political effect. The higher political
competition of a region, the more resources (CCT) will be provided to the region by
the politicians, which is shown by an increase in political competition leading to an
increase in CCT allocation of 13 percent [17].
3. Methodology
For the empirical analysis, we use the panel data on 335 local governments from
2013 to 2015. The objects of this study are the local governments that received the
budget allocation of PKH in 2013–2015 with a sample size of 1.005 local governments.
Data CCT allocations distributed to local government are obtained from the Ministry of
Social. Human Development Index (HDI) and the percentage of the poor are obtained
from the Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS). Data local government social expenditures
are obtained from the Ministry of Finance. All data about political factor, that is, presi-
dential and legislative election results, are obtained from General Election Commission
(KPU). Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
CCT 1.005 17.839,62 1.363.475,00 172.570,80 105.289,20
HDI 985 51,55 82,22 68,89 5,53
Percent Poor 1.005 1,33 35,99 12,77 6,50
Social Exp. 982 0,00 0,17 0,04 0,03
Vote Share 977 8,37 96,14 57,47 16,44
Constellation 975 0,00 1,00 0,88 0,33
Competitiveness 977 –92,27 –0,16 –28,77 21,81
Elect 1.005 0,00 1,00 0,33 0,47
Pre-elect 1.005 0,00 1,00 0,33 0,47
Note: CCT = Per capita CCT; HDI = Human Development Index; Percent Poor = Percentage of Poor;
Social Exp = Proportion of Social Expenditure (t–1); Vote Share = President vote share; Constellation
= Political constellation; Competitiveness = Competitiveness; Elect = Election year; Pre-elect = Pre-
election year
In the benchmark model, we use socioeconomic and political factors as independent
variables. Socioeconomic factors are utilized as independent variables: HDI, percent-
age poor and social expenditure. To examine political criteria, we use three political
variables: president vote share, political constellation and competitiveness. Based on
the aforementioned discussion, we use the estimation model to identify the effects of
socioeconomic and political factors to the distribution of CCT program as follow:
CCT𝑖𝑡 = α – β1IPM𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2Percent_poor𝑖,𝑡−1 – β3Social_Exp𝑖,𝑡−1+ β4Voteshare𝑖,𝑡−1+
β5Constellation𝑖,𝑡−1+ β6Competitiveness𝑖,𝑡−1+ β7Elect𝑡 + β8Preelect𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,
where i = 1, 2, …, 335 is the index for local government, t indicates time, α is constant,
β1 – β8 are coefficients, and 𝜀 is an error term.
4. Findings
Table 2 presents the estimates of the effect of socioeconomic and political factors on
CCT per capita. Column 1 presents the results of socioeconomic factor regression on
CCT per capita. By using only socioeconomic factors, it shows that CCT program is a
program that has an important role in the function of redistribution. This is indicated by
negative association of HDI and social expenditure. These two socioeconomic variables
support our argument that governments will distribute larger CCT to region with less
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Table 2: Operational definition and measurement.
Variable Measurement Reference
CCT The aggregate of CCT allocation
distributed to local government in
2013–2015 divided by the number of
poor people
Ministry of Social
HDI Using BPS calculation BPS (www.bps.go.id)
Percent Poor The proportion of poor people with the
population in a region, using BPS
calculation
BPS (www.bps.go.id)
Social Exp Total subsidy, social assistance and
grants expenditure divided by total
local government expenditure
Ministry of Finance (www.djpk.go.id)
Vote Share Vote share of SBY-Boediono
candidates in 2009 presidential
elections and vote share of Jokowi-JK
in 2014 presidential election
General Election Commission (KPU)
Constellation Dummy variable, takes value of 1 if the
top three in the local legislative
elections (DPRD) is occupied by at
least two political parties that become
the top three in the 2009 and 2014
legislative elections of the House of
Representatives (DPR); 0 otherwise
Top three in the 2009 are Demokrat,
Golkar, PDIP Top three in the 2014 are
PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra
General Election Commission (KPU)
Competitiveness Negative of the absolute value of the
difference between the winner and
the competitor in the 2009 and 2014
presidential elections
General Election Commission (KPU)
Elect Dummy variable, takes value of 1 in
election year; 0 otherwise
General Election Commission (KPU)
Pre-elect Dummy variable, takes value of 1 in
pre-election year; 0 otherwise
General Election Commission (KPU)
human-resource quality and to regions that have low capacity in local social protec-
tion. However, the result of the socioeconomic variables, namely, percentage poor
shows the opposite direction to our argument in developing the hypothesis, although
statistically significant.
In column 2, we add three variables to determine the influence of political factors on
CCT per capita, namely, president vote share, political constellation and competitive-
ness. The socioeconomic variables show the same result with column 1 and political
factor indicates that vote share and competitiveness are positively associated with
CCT per capita. The results indicate that politicians will provide greater resources to
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Table 3: The impact of socioeconomic and political factors on the distribution of CCT expenditures, 2013–
2015.
Model 1 2 3
HDI –0.0352 –0.035 –0.001
0.000𝑎 0.000𝑎 0.743
Percent Poor –0.056 –0.058 0.001
0.000𝑎 0.000𝑎 0.929
Social Exp –0.986 –0.991 –0.485
0.015𝑏 0.014𝑏 0.139










F-value 144.18 70.84 123.72
sig 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-within 0.4082 0.4175 0.6261
R-between 0.0015 0.0012 0.2156
R-overall 0.0089 0.0088 0.3353
Significance level a: 1%; b: 5%; c: 10%
the region, both of which are the basis of supporters and whose level of political
competition is high. While the other political variable, namely, political constellation
is insignificant.
To test our hypothesis, we add two variables control: dummy variables that are
election year and pre-election year. The model in column 3 shows different results on
socioeconomic factors. Models 1 and 2 show consistently that HDI and social expendi-
tures are statistically significant, but model 3 shows empirical evidence that HDI and
social spending are insignificant. Interestingly, vote shares and competitiveness show
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similar results both in models 2 and 3, which are significant and positively associated
to CCT per capita. Control variable present significant results but have an opposite
direction on coefficient regression.
In general, this indicates that CCT is used as a strategy to win the election. As we
have expected that vote shares and competitiveness are positively associated to CCT
per capita, the president from a political party will use the authority and government
resources to conduct a vote-buying strategy. The government will allocate larger CCTs
to areas that are the basis of its supporters or who provide more support in previous
elections to maintain and improve electoral performance in the next election. This
result supports Schady (2000); Dahlberg and Johansson (2002); Baez et al. (2012);
Nupia (2011); Aytaç (2014) that shows that politicians are using CCT to improve their
votes in elections.
Furthermore, the result showed by competitiveness indicates that politicians
attempt to swing voter strategy. This result supports Schady (2000) that suggests an
increase in CCT coverage to region with largermarginal political effect. Marginal political
effect is the change in vote shares between two election. If vote shares decrease, it
means that political competition in this region is more stringent than before.
In contrast with vote share and competitiveness, political constellation is insignifi-
cant. This may be due to the voter’s view of the division of political parties’ power to
avoid the dominant political parties. Indonesia has experience related to the dominant
political parties for about three decades. Based on these experiences, voters are more
concerned with these views in shaping election behavior. In this study, we also found
evidence that CCT programs cannot perform redistribution functions optimally. This
is indicated by the fact that all socioeconomic variables are insignificant. It does not
support Schady (2000) and Aytaç (2014) that shows that the CCT program is a program
with a redistribution function.
To check the robustness of the results to a change in the estimationmethod, we also
estimated the regressions with interaction term among variables (see Appendix 1). In
general, result of robust check, only HDI and percentage poor show the consistent
result as an explanatory variable. While the others are inconsistent, which indicates
thus that variables are latent that can be improved.
5. Conclusion
Using the data of CCT allocations in Indonesia between 2013 and 2015, we found
evidence that CCT budget distributions are more influenced by political factors than
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socioeconomic factors. This indicates that the CCT program is used by politicians to
maintain power in government. In addition, the absence of socioeconomic factor
influencing the CCT distribution indicates that CCT, which is a social protection program,
cannot perform redistribution functions optimally. A policy recommendation that
can be extracted from our research is to provide additional consideration to the
examiner and supervisory agency in conducting the monitoring of the CCT program
implementation. For further research, additional socioeconomic variables can be
added and other national social protection programs can be used, such as Direct Cash
Assistance (BLT) and Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (PNPM).
Appendix 1
Table 4: Robust Check
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
IPM -0,037 -0,030 -0,037 -0,037 -0,037 -0,033





















F-value 174,280 117,110 181,640 120,900 177,400 120,400
sig 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
R-within 0,360 0,362 0,370 0,370 0,364 0,369
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R-between 0,069 0,069 0,064 0,064 0,067 0,066
R-overall 0,111 0,111 0,108 0,108 0,112 0,114
Model 7 8 9 10 11 12
IPM
Percent_Poor -0,103 -0,096 -0,099 -0,106 -0,099 -0,095




















F-value 40,810 27,600 39,230 27,140 40,260 28,020
sig 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
R-within 0,113 0,115 0,109 0,113 0,112 0,116
R-between 0,023 0,023 0,022 0,022 0,023 0,024
R-overall 0,005 0,005 0,006 0,005 0,005 0,005
Model 21 22 23 24 25 26
IPM
Percent_Poor
Financial 0,234 3,435 0,197 -0,184 0,265 0,391





















F-value 0,460 2,520 0,270 0,260 1,420 0,960
sig 0,629 0,057 0,764 0,853 0,244 0,411
R-within 0,002 0,012 0,001 0,001 0,005 0,005
R-between 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,000 0,006 0,007
R-overall 0,000 0,002 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,000
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